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"Many is the custody case which almost seems to outlive the parents ....
To remedy this problem, many members of the legal profession advocate greater
utilization of arbitration to include determination of child custody.' As state
courts struggle to incorporate and interpret the Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA")
into child custody case law, the Dick case stands as the latest decision
demonstrating the advantages and pitfalls of using binding arbitration to resolve
custody disputes.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1990, Leslie Dick filed for divorce from his wife of two and a half years,
Linda Dick.4 Both parties agreed to submit all issues, including child custody and
support, to binding arbitration.5 After the arbitrator issued his opinion, including
1. 534 N.W.2d 185 (Mich. CL App. 1995).
2. Stephen W. Schlissel, Why Arbitrate Domestic Relations Matters?, 458 PI/LIT 195 (1993).
3. Warren E. Burger, Isn't There A Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 276 (1982); Alfred R.
Belinkie, Matrimonial Arbitration, 65 CONN. B.J. 309, 311-12 (1991); Stephen W. Schlissel, A4
Proposal forFinal andBinding Arbitration ofInitial Custody Determinations, 26 FAM LQ. 71 (1992);
Vincent P. Celli, Matrimonial Arbitration: An Old Technique in a New Home, 157 NEW JERSEY
LAWYER 40 (Dec. 1993); Schlissel, supra note 2.
4. Dick v. Dick, 534 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Mich. Ct App. 1995).
5. Important conditions of the parties' arbitration agreement include:
B. The Arbitrator shall be considered, in all respects, to be a substitute for the Circuit
Judge in this case and shall be accorded all of the powers, duties, rights and obligations
of the Circuit Judge, including, but not necessarily limited to, the determination of all
issues present in this divorce action, including all pre-judgment (discovery, etc.) and
judgment matters involving the parties to this litigation and their minor child.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the decision of the Arbitrator, as incorporated in the
Judgment of Divorce, shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals on the same basis and
with the same legal effect as though the decision had been rendered by the Circuit Judge;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal of this matter to the Court of Appeals shall
not be based on the procedure which the Arbitrator has deemed to be reasonable, as set
1
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findings of fact utilizing the "best interests of the child" factors enumerated in
Michigan statutory law,6 the trial court entered a judgment of divorce that fully
incorporated the arbitrator's conclusions.7
Leslie Dick then brought the arbitrator's decision to the Michigan Court of
Appeals.8 He argued that the arbitration agreement was void ab initio because it
was tantamount to allowing the trial court to appoint a private judge."
Alternatively, he asserted that if the court deemed the arbitration agreement valid,
the agreement should be declared void because Michigan does not recognize
forth above, but shall be based solely on the substantive decision of the Arbitrator, neither
party having the right to a trial de nova in this matter, except as it may be based upon
errors of substance (as opposed to procedure) committed by the Arbitrator which the
Court of Appeals determines to necessitate such trial de novo.
Dick; 534 N.W.2d at 187.
6. The arbitrator issued a comprehensive, detailed opinion on all the terms of the divorce. Id
Michigan law, found at MIcit COM. LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (Supp. 1995), sets forth the
following factors to be assessed in determining the "best interests of the child":
(a) The love, affection, and other emotionalties existing between the parties involved and
the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love, affection,
and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in his or her religion
or creed, if any.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with food,
clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of
this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, and the
desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or
homes.
(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child to be of
sufficient age to express preference.
(j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a close
and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent or the
child and the parents.
(k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed against or witnessed4
the child.
(1) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child custody
dispute.
MIC- COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (Supp. 1995).
7. The arbitrator issued his opinion over two years after the commencement of arbitration.
According to the court,
[t]he length of the arbitration proceedings is directly related to the acrimonious approach
of he parties, especially plaintiff. But for the Vexatious litigation tactics employed by the
parties throughout the proceedings, this matter could have been resolved in a more
expeditious manner. At this point, the parties' divorce proceedings have lasted nearly
twice as long as their marriage.
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binding arbitration in divorce agreements." Mr. Dick stressed his belief that
"arbitration [was] not an acceptableprocedure for resolving issues of child custody
and support.""
'
The court of appeals found that although the parties' arbitration agreement
referred to the arbitrator as a "private judge," those references were at most
"colloquial expressions describing the arbitrator's powers by analogy to judicial
functions.' 2 In holding the agreement valid, the court stated that the parties
sought permission from the circuit court to enter into binding arbitration, such
permission was granted, and that the parties were now bound by the arbitration
determination. 3
In this case of first impression, 14 the Dick court held that when divorcing
parties agree to binding arbitration of all issues, including child custody and
support, the arbitration award is valid and unappealable except in cases involving
fraud or duress." The court could find no case law or any specific legislative
intent, in either the Michigan Child Custody Act or the Uniform Arbitration Act,
to limit arbitration in child custody situations. 6
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Historically, the legal system frowned on the use of arbitration in situations
involving child custody or support.' 7 More recently, as arbitration becomes more
desirable and acceptable as an alternative to traditional litigation, the arbitrability
of child custody is again under consideration.'"Because child custody remains one
of the few areas of law over which courts generally wish to exercise exclusive
control, courts are under increasing pressure to demonstrate valid reasons for
continuing to deny enforceability of arbitrated child custody.' 9
10. Id
11. Id Leslie Dick raised this objection only after the arbitration awarded custody to Linda. Id.
12. Id. The court determined that the agreement did not intend to make the arbitrator a judge
"acting under the color of right as a duly appointed judge." Id. (citing Brockman v. Brockman, 317
N.W.2d 327, 328 (Mich. CL App, 1982)).
13. Id. at 188.
14. Id
15. Id at 190.
16. Id at 190-91.
17. HOMmE H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 14.8
(2d ed. 1988).
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The traditional premise of non-arbitrability of child custody disputes is well
articulated by Stewart Sterk.21 Professor Sterk believes that "[it is the inability
to represent properly the interests of the child, who, of course, never consented to
arbitration in the first place, that makes arbitration an inappropriate forum for
resolution of custody disputes."2' Ample support for this view is found in the
case law of many jurisdictions.22  In Sheets v. Sheets,' a New York court
reasoned that arbitration could not limit the court's parens patriae power.24 The
arbitrator's award would be subject to de novo review by the court to the extent
that such an award conflicted with the best interests of the child,25 and the award
would not be res judicata against the child who was not a party to the
arbitration.26
In Fence v. Fence, the court expressed serious doubt whether custody
should be arbitrable at all,28 stating that the courts are the only decisionmakers
capable of evaluating and protecting the best interests of the child. Until recently,
the overwhelming majority of courts and legal authorities followed this view.29
The consensus of most courts was that custody disputes could be arbitrated, but
that the arbitrator's award would be subject to de novo review. 0
In recent years, arbitrability of child custody is receiving inconsistent
treatment. Some courts refuse to enforce agreements to arbitrate custody as
contrary to the traditional public policy of entrusting the courts to protect the best
20. Stewart E. Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public
Policy Defense, 2 CARDoZo L. REV. 481 (1981).
21. Id. at 502.
22. See Sheets v. Sheets, 22 A.D.2d 176 (N.Y. 1964); Fence v. Fence, 314 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (N.Y.
City Faro. Ct. 1980); Faherty v. Faherty, 477 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1984); Crutchley v. Crutchley, 293
S.E.2d 793 (N.C. 1982); Biel v. Biel, 336 N.W.2d 404 (Wis. 1983); Rustad v. Rustad, 314 S.E.2d 275
(N.C. 1984). See generally J.F. Ghent, Validity and Construction of Provision for Arbitration of
Disputes as to Alimony and Support Payments, or Child Visitation or Custody Matters, Annot, 18
A.LR.3d 1264 (1968).
23. Sheets, 22 A.D.2d at 176.
24. Id Parens patriae, in the context of child custody determination, occurs when the court is
acting on behalf of the state to protect the interests of the child. "It is the principle that the state must
care for those who cannot take care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper care and custody
from their parents." BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
25. Id.
26. Id. Support for this proposition is found in both case law and public policy. See supra note
22. The public policy concept that non-parties should not be bound is traditionally demonstrated with
the precepts of res judicata. For further support of the policies involved, see CLARK, supra note 17;
Sterk, supra note 20.
27. 314 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (N.Y. City Fain. Ct. 1970).
28. Id at 1020.
29. See supra note 22.
30. CLARK, supra note 17, at 577; see also infra note 35.
[Vol. 1996, No. I
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interests of the child." In Glauber v. Glauber,32 the court stated that "when
circumstances require determining which living arrangements are in the best
interests of children, the courts alone must undertake the task."33 Glauber held
that custody must be determined by the court and may not be submitted to
arbitration.
34
Other courts, in keeping with the Sheets viewpoint, uphold the arbitrated
custody arrangement as long as it does not negate the best interests of the child.35
As stated in Miller v. Miller,36 the court wants to encourage parties to resolve
disputes, if possible, without court intervention. Once called upon to protect
the best interests of the child, however, the court may not ignore its obligation to
do so.
31
No court, until Dick, enforced the arbitration of custody solely on the ground
that there was no "clear prohibition in case law, court rule, or statute against the
use of binding arbitration in the resolution of custody disputes.
3 9
31. Glauberv. Glauber, 192 A-D.2d 94 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). See also Biel, 336 N.W.2d at 404
(custody determinations must be made by the court and cannot be delegated to any other person). It
was noted in Faherty that "[clhildren's... custody... and overall best interests have always been
subject to the close scrutiny and supervision of the courts despite any agreements to the contrary."
Faherty, 477 A.2d at 1262. These courts also continue to mention the lack ofresjudicata. See supra
notes 22 and 26 and accompanying text.
32. Glauber, 192 A.D.2d at 94.
33. Id. at 99.
34. Id
35. See Faherty, 477 A.2d at 1257 (no review if it is clear that the award could not adversely
affect the best interests of the child); Miller v. Miller, 620 A.2d 1161 (1993) (arbitration of child
custody not void as against public policy, but not binding if award is challenged by one of the parties
as not being in the best interests of the child); Kovacs v. Kovacs, 633 A.2d 425 (1993) (parens patriae
necessitates independent judgment by the court with respect to matters concerning the best interests of
the child). See supra note 3 and text accompanying note 18.
It is certainly worth noting that those courts who believe arbitrated custody is enforceable but
reviewable on the merits seem unconcerned with the fact that they are violating the basic premise of
unreviewability of arbitration as set forth in the UAA Uniform Arbitration Act § 12(a), 7 Unif. L
Ann. 140 (1985) [hereinafter UAA]. See CLARK, supra note 17, at 578.
36. Miller, 620 A.2d at 1165.
37. Id
38. Id
39. Dick, 534 N.W.2d at 190.
1996]
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Dick court located authority to permit the use of binding arbitration in
Michigan Court Rule 3.216.40 Noting that the rule focuses on mediation, the
court determined that the rule nonetheless authorized the use of other un-
enumerated "settlement procedures" to resolve domestic disputes." Moreover,
the court discovered additional support in Michigan case law for using binding
arbitration.42
Having gone this far in supporting the arbitration agreement, the court next
turned to the validity of allowing child custody and support to be determined by
arbitration.43  The court found authority to uphold arbitrated child support
disputes under the Michigan Child Custody Act.44 The court then turned to the
remaining issue: Whether child custody may be submitted to binding
arbitration.45
The Dick court used a three-prong analysis to determine arbitrability of child
custody."' Case law "that has led to the widely held belief that custody decisions
are the exclusive province of the circuit court '47 was balanced with the provisions
of the Child Custody Act and the effect of the UAA.48  The court ultimately
40. The court noted that this rule concerns itself with mediation in domestic relations proceedings
but that it contains a fairly broad grant of authority regarding settlement procedures. MIC. CT. RULE
3.216 provides:
(A) Scope and Applicability of Rule. A court may submit any pending divorce, separate
maintenance, or annulment proceeding, including post-judgment matters, to mediation
under this rule for the purposes of attempting to settle contested issues. Nothing in this
rule ...
(3) prohibits the court from ordering, on stipulation of the parties, the use of modified
mediation or other settlement procedures.
Dick, 534 N.W.2d at 188 (citing MICa CT. RULE 3.216).
41. According to the court, "Binding arbitration certainly qualifies as a settlement procedure." Id.
42. In Marvin v. Marvin, 511 N.W.2d 708 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), the court relied on the same
court rules (see supra note 36) to approve the use of binding mediation to resolve property distribution
issues in divorce cases. Id. The Marvin court also reiterated their prior court ruling that "where the
parties to a divorce action agree to submit certain issues to a third party and to accept the decision of
the third party as binding, they are bound by the third party's decision absent a showing of such factors
as duress or fraud." Marvin, 511 N.W.2d at 709-10 (citing Balabuch v. Balabuch, 502 N.W.2d 381
(Mich. CL App. 1993)).
43. Dick 534 N.W.2d at l88.
44. "The Child Custody Act, M.C.L. § 722.21 et seq., M.S.A. § 25.312(1) et seq., grants circuit
courts the power to enter a support order to which the parties have agreed." Dick; 534 N.W.2d at 188.
45. Id. at 189.
46. Id.
47. Id. The court notes that circuit courts have "zealously and carefully refrained from permitting
the friend of the court of any other party or agency to make custody determinations," however, this
court then goes on to do just the opposite. Id
48. MtC. CoM. LAwS ANN. § 600.5001 (1992).
6
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found "no clear prohibition in case law, court rule, or statute against the use of
binding arbitration in the resolution of custody disputes."4 9  The court went
further to say "[b]inding arbitration is an acceptable and appropriate method of
dispute resolution in cases where the parties agree to it."5
Finally, the court addressed the availability of judicial review in binding
arbitraion.5' The premise of binding aibitration is that the agreement is to be
given broad application.52 The parties in this case attempted to create a "hybrid
form of arbitration. "" No authority could be found for such an agreement, and
the court determined that, "having invoked binding arbitration, the parties are
required to proceed according to the applicable statute and court rule. '54  The
49. Dick; 534 N.W.2d at 190. In essence, the court found that case law, while prohibiting the
friend of the court or any other party to make custody determinations, did allow agreements by the
parties regarding child custody to be enforced. See Koron v. Melendy, 523 N.W.2d 870, 871 (Mich.
CL App. 1994). Further, the provisions of the UAA were deemed "clear on its face," with language
that is broad and seemingly all inclusive. Dick 534 N.W.2d at 190. The UAA provides:
(1) All persons, except infants and persons of unsound mind, may, by an instrument in
writing, submit to the decision of I or more arbitrators, any controversy existing between
them, which might be the subject of a civil action, except as herein otherwise provided,
and may, in such submission, agree that a judgment of any circuit court shall be rendered
upon the award made pursuant to such submission.
MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5001 (1992).
The court believed that the act "permits all persons to submit any controversy to arbitration upon
their agreement" Id. By "balancing the Court's instructions to the lower courts regarding custody
determinations with the arbitration statute's more recent and broad language, custody disputes are not
exempted from arbitration." Id. The Child Custody Act was also found to have no specific prohibition
of arbitration of custody disputes. Id.
The court looked last at the language of MICHIGAN CT. RuLE 3.210(C), covering "Custody of
a Minor." The Friend of the Court Act, cited within the court rule, requires the friend of the court to
provide domestic relations mediation to assist the parties in voluntarily settling custody or visitation
disputes. MicW CoMe. LAWS ANN. § 552.513 (1992). The Dick court did not believe that the rule
prohibited binding arbitration, stating "[ijt requires a hearing in a contested case. Yet, if the parties
agree to binding arbitration, they effectively move the dispute to a different forum. The court rule
does not appear to prohibit such action." Id. at 190.
50. Id. at 191. This sweeping statement in favor of arbitration will be discussed more fully in
Section V.
51. Dick, 534 N.W.2d at 191.
52. MICHIGAN CT. RULE 3.602(J) states that an arbitration award may not be set aside unless:
(1) the arbitrator or another is guilty of corruption, fraud, or used other undue means; (2)
the arbitrator evidenced partiality, corruption, or misconduct prejudicing a party's rights;
(3) the arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's power, or (4) the arbitrator refused to
postpone the hearing on a showing of sufficient cause, refused to hear material evidence,
or conducted the hearing to prejudice substantially a party's rights.
Dick, 534 N.W.2d at 191 (citing MIC-. CT. RUL 3.602(3), Gordon Sel-way, Inc. N. Spence Bros., Inc.,
475 N.W.2d 704, 709 (1991).
53. Dick 534 N.W.2d at 191.
54. Id.; see supra note 48. In the present case, there was no allegation of fraud, duress or any
other exception that would allow judicial review of the substantive agreement
7
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Dick court struck the substantive appealability clause of the agreement which
reformed the binding arbitration agreement to follow Michigan statutes and court
rules."5 Because the court could not find a permissible reason for substantive
review based on the facts of this case, it declined to review the agreement any
further. 1 The Dick court concluded that, when divorcing parties agree to binding
arbitration to resolve the issue of child custody, the subsequent arbitration award
is enforceable.5 7
V. COMMENT
The Michigan Court of Appeals decision in Dick effectively eliminates one
of the last impediments to the use of binding arbitration in the domestic arena.
By upholding an arbitral award that determines child custody, the court rejects
traditional notions of unenforceability based on the child not being a party and on
the court's parens patriae authority.5" With this decision, the Dick court takes
an enormous step away from previously decided cases relating to arbitration of
child custody." The question now becomes whether this is a positive step
forward for domestic relations dispute resolution or a step further away from
protecting the needs of the most important people involved - the children.
Traditional limitations on arbitration of child custody have strong roots.6°
The fundamental premise of the non-binding nature of a legal determination on
those not parties to the dispute is central to our jurisprudence. 6' To now
effectively bind non-parties (the children) based on the decision of others runs
completely contrary to this premise. It is accepted that, in divorce arbitration, the
husband and wife may be bound by the arbitrator's findings.62 But also to bind
the children requires asking who is representing their interests.63 While the Dick
decision discusses the arbitrator's utilization of the statutory "best interests of the
child" considerations,' what allows the court to determine that the arbitrator was
in fact putting the child's interests before those of the parents? The court has no
substantive review in binding arbitration, except in jurisdictions that permit limited
55. Dick, 534 N.W.2d at 191.
56. Id The court found support for this interpretation in Marvin, 511 NW.2d at 709-10.
57. Dick, 534 N.W.2d at 190-91.
58. See sources cited supra note 22; see also supra note 24.
59. See supra notes 22, 31-36 and accompanying text.
60. See supra tote 17.
61. RESTATME&W (SECOND) OF JUIxIMErN § 34(3) (1982).
62. Belinkie, supra note 3, at 309.
63. CLARY, supra note 17; Sterk, supra note 20.
64. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1996, No. I
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review for manifest disregard of the law. 65 Furthermore, the precedent in Dick
opens the door to future fact situations where the child will be unrepresented and
unheard, yet bound by the parents agreed determination.'
Glauber stated that "[a] court cannot be bound by an agreement as to child
custody and visitation... and simultaneously act as parenspatriae on behalf of
the child."'67 According to the Glauber court, in any situation involving custody
of children, this parenspatriae responsibility should always supersede agreements
made by others." Glauber also noted that, given the increasing acceptance of
binding arbitration, the "best interests" analysis paramount in child custody
determinations is more incompatible with arbitration than ever before.69
There are cogent arguments for increasing the availability and use of
arbitration for the resolution of domestic disputes.7" For example, there is little
merit to the idea that agreed upon arbitration is anything but a positive
development in the resolution of most divorce actions.7 The parties' satisfaction
increases when they feel that their individual needs have been considered and that
determinations were made to best reflect the relative importance of those needs.72
The adversarial nature of the traditional divorce action is minimized, and the
likelihood of continuing cooperative relations between the parties is greater."
However, closejudicial scrutiny must accompany any binding arbitration that
determines child custody.74 Until further developments in arbitral procedure are
made to insure the protection of the child's interests, the court system must remain
involved.75 Crowded dockets and a public policy favoring arbitration76 do not
65. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overredon other grounds, Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). Wilko addresses, in dictum, vacating
arbitral awards which are in "manifest disregard" of the applicable law. Id. See Douglas E. Abrams,
Arbilrabilily in Recent Federal Civil Rights Legislation: The Need for Amendment, 26 CONN. L REV.
521, 568 n.227 (1994).
66. This is one of the cautions discussed by both Sterk and Clark; see svpra notes 17 and 20. A
good example of what could occur involves the situation where neither parent is a suitable custodian
for the child; yet, the arbitrator is unable to consider any other options. See Sterk, supra note 20, at
500.
67. Glauber, 192 A.D.2d at 97-98.
68. Id. at 98.
69. Id.




74. Kovacs, 633 A.2d at 431; Miller, 620 A-2d at 1164. See also CLARK supra note 17, at 577-
78 and Sterk, supra note 20, at 500-01.
75. Glauber, 192 A.D.2d at 99.
76. Fahery, 477 A-2d at 1262. See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
473 U.S. 614 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19961
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outweigh the needs of the children.77 The fact that Dick is the first decision to
uphold binding arbitration on child custody is acknowledgment of this fact. The
arguments against this application of arbitration are well-reasoned.78
Perhaps it is better to look at the Dick decision not as breaking new ground
for court abdication of child interests, but rather as the court's plea for help from
the legislature of Michigan and any other state that does not specifically address
this issue in its enactment of the UAA or in its custody act. The Dick court was
careful to enunciate that "[tihe language of the arbitration statute is broad and
seemingly all inclusive. It permits all persons to submit any controversy to
arbitration upon their agreement. It does not specifically exempt any civil action
from binding arbitration."79 We should view Dick as a call for legislative action
to protect children of divorce.80
Our goal should be to protect children from the pitfalls of arbitrable child
custody while allowing them to gain the benefits of private dispute resolution.
Such protection should include legislative amendments to each state's version of
the UAA that specify the procedures required in arbitrating child custody. For
example, a guardian ad litem should be required to represent the child's interests
in the arbitral proceeding. Parties using arbitration should be required to choose
an arbitrator specializing in domestic relations. The courts should allow
substantive review in cases of manifest disregard of the law.8 ' Limiting
arbitration of child custody in this manner incorporates the protections needed for
the children while allowing both parents and children to resolve sensitive issues
in privacy and with minimal acrimony, thereby serving both arbitration promotion
policies and the needs of the children.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Dick, not only did the arbitration of the marriage dissolution take longer
than the existence of the marriage, but the parties were dissatisfied with the result.
Meanwhile, the child of the marriage was unrepresented and largely unheard. If
arbitration is to be utilized as a positive alternative to litigation of domestic
relations disputes, provisions must be made for protecting the child's interests.
Absent specific guidelines within state enactments of the UAA or state custody
acts, binding arbitration of child custody has the potential to contradict the "best
77. Faherty, 474 A-2d at 1262.
78. See supra notes 17, 20, 31. See also Agur v. Agur, 32 A.2d 16 (Pa. 1969) and Nester v.
Nestel, 38 A.D.2d 942 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972).
79. Dick, 534 N.W.2d at 190 (emphasis added).
80. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1996, No. I
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interests of the child" analysis integral to custody determinations. s2 Allowing the
Dick precedent to increase the use of binding arbitration in custody disputes
without refinements to the process inhibits progress toward satisfactory resolution
of child custody where the best interests of the child are truly served.
BARBARA E. WiLSON
82. CLARK, supra note 17, at 577; Fence, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 1020.
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